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Thinking, Recognition and Otherness 
 
There was her body, quiet, used, resting: there was her 
mind, free, clear, shining: there was the boy and his 
eyes, seeing what? And ecstasy. Things would hurt when 
this light dimmed. The boy would change. But now in the 
sun she recognised him, and recognised that she did not 
know, and had never seen him, and loved him, in the 
bright new air with a simplicity she had never expected 
to know. “You,” she said to him, skin for the first time 
on skin in the outside air, which was warm and shining, 
“you.”  (A.S. Byatt, Still Life, London: Vintage, 1985, 
p.114) 
 
Stephanie Potter, in A.S. Byatt’s great novel, emerges from 
giving birth to her first child and sees him there, 
unexpectedly other than her. In this moment there is both 
recognition and acknowledgement of unbridgeable difference: 
“she recognised him, and recognised that she did not know, and 
had never seen him”; clear-eyed, Stephanie knows what she does 
not know, and loves her son across the great divide. Slightly 
later, when her husband Daniel arrives to see the child (this 
is 1954, and he has not been present at his son’s birth), the 
importance of the baby’s otherness is again confirmed. 
“It’s funny,” he said. “I hadn’t thought it. I hadn’t 
thought he’d be somebody.” 
“No. I hadn’t either. I was so surprised when I saw his 
separate bed. But he is, isn’t he?” (p.117) 
Stephanie’s capacity to think in the midst of this intense 
feeling state means that she can retain her own autonomy, yet 
also be aware of the reality of the other, return his gaze, 
see in him a set of possible future unfoldings (“The boy would 
change”). Unexpectedly to herself (though not necessarily to 
the reader of the novel, because her capacities for feeling 
are already well attested to), Stephanie feels a simple, 
straightforward love for this strange creature. The suggestion 
is that it is precisely from the acknowledgement of the baby’s 
strangeness, his immediate difference, that the mother’s 
clarity of thought and love arise; this is not a gender issue, 
but a simple, immediate recognition of the existence of 
something new in the world. Stephanie’s appreciation of the 
infant’s separateness from her is, paradoxically, an 
indication of how just how much in contact with him she is. 
 
Byatt has said1 that she was striving in these passages to 
describe as exactly as she could her own experience of having 
her first baby and being struck by the separateness of the 
small creature, and by the love that arose out of that very 
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separateness. That is, Stephanie’s experience is a remembered 
version of Byatt’s own, a testimony to a certain kind of 
maternal care. It can, therefore, be taken as a personal 
narrative, a story not “just” imagined, but also revelatory of 
a psychological process. In this paper, we want to suggest 
that there is something ideal about this, using it as an image 
(the most appropriate way to consider idealisations) of what 
might be the conditions required in order to promote a certain 
desirable mental capacity. This capacity one might call that 
of being able to think for oneself, or -more ambitiously- to 
construct an inner space; the suggestion here is that a sort 
of privacy is needed for this to occur, and this privacy is a 
consequence of being able to “recognise but not know”. The 
mother’s capacity to see and love the child but not take her 
or him over, not colonise the child’s mental space, may be the 
key paradigm of how she can be allowed to think. 
 
The Conditions for Thought 
What are the conditions under which it is possible to think? 
In many respects, this is the key question facing contemporary 
psychoanalysis, and possibly (more importantly) contemporary 
society as a whole. This is especially so if thinking is 
extended to mean all those processes of consideration and 
reflection, of active processing of one’s interior states of 
mind, with which modern human subjects struggle. Perhaps, 
drawing on research into “theory of mind” as well as “psychic 
reality” (Fonagy and Target, 1996), one can argue that the 
distinctive characteristic of human subjectivity is the 
capacity to reflect, to “think about thinking”; that this is 
what marks humans out as tragic as well as feeling creatures. 
In Kleinian terms, for example, it is what makes people 
capable of inhabiting the depressive position, in which one 
owns one’s thoughts, be they as destructive as can be. The 
characteristic of paranoid-schizoid thought is that ideas and 
feelings are thrown out of the mind, projected into the 
surrounding objects, hence effectively disowned; as Bion 
(1962) so profoundly shows, they are not thought, but 
evacuated. With depressive thinking, there is a realisation 
that the painful ideas emerging within us are real and have 
cogency; they need facing, and their emotional impact is not 
only to be withstood, but is also to be understood as what 
marks us out as alive. The contribution of Kleinian thinking 
here is its tragic vision of mental processes: in damage and 
loss, the human subject also finds its reality. 
 
It is perhaps ironic that in a period in which the study of 
reflective psychic processes has become a concern of 
psychologists and psychoanalysts, actually managing to be 
reflective about oneself seems to be an increasingly difficult 
task -for individuals and for the societies of which they are 
members. As has often been noted (e.g. Frosh, 1991), this is a 
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distinct difference from the position when Freud was first 
writing about psychoanalysis. Then, at the turn of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the trouble with which 
people found themselves faced seemed to revolve around how to 
control the depths, how to manage the intensity of their 
feelings, especially in an ostensibly repressive society in 
which “free expression” of emotion or thought was severely 
circumscribed. Early psychoanalysis aimed both to give voice 
to these intense feelings and ideas -to repressed desires- and 
through doing so to increase the capacity of the individual to 
live at peace with them, both by accepting their impossibility 
and also by utilising at least some of the psychic energy 
bound up with them in the service of more everyday tasks -the 
famous Freudian “work and love”. When one reads about Freud’s 
patients now, a hundred years on, it is very striking to see 
how they seem to live such passionate lives, intimating such 
yearning and such need; they are intelligent on the whole, but 
overwhelmed by the restlessness inside them. In contrast, 
modern patients seem to be characterised more by flatness than 
by depth, by a trouble not over how to manage their feelings, 
but over how to feel anything at all. A generation ago, 
Guntrip (1973, p. 148) offered a characteristic description of 
such patients: 
They are the people who have very deep-seated doubts 
about the reality and viability of their very “self”, who 
are ultimately found to be suffering from various degrees 
of depersonalisation, unreality, the dread feeling of 
“not belonging”, of being fundamentally isolated and out 
of touch with the world... The problem here is not 
relations with other people but whether one has or is a 
self. 
This account predates the penetration of psychoanalysis by 
postmodern thought, but was part of a struggle with a 
narcissistic or schizoid mode of being which was understood as 
pathological rather than the contemporary norm. Given how the 
situation has escalated, if postmodern writers are to be 
believed (e.g. Jameson, 1991), it is not surprising that 
narcissistic and borderline states have proved to be of 
enduring interest, because they describe both the 
phenomenology of the shallowness endemic to personal and 
social life, and the sense of panic associated with this 
shallowness as people see their own lives passing them by 
(Lasch, 1979, wrote one especially influential piece of 
“cultural psychoanalysis” on exactly this topic). Now the 
question is not so much how to survive in a repressive social 
environment, as how to come alive in the first place. If the 
indications from nineteenth century novels are anything to go 
by, people then (at least, privileged people) were bored with 
what the world could offer them, when measured against what 
they felt they could do, what enjoyment they could have. 
Nowadays, people are more often bored with themselves. 
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The recent interest in social manifestations of “melancholia” 
is perhaps an indication of something changing, a “deeper” 
time beginning to stir. The most interesting cultural 
commentator on this is Judith Butler, who sees in Freud’s 
(1917) Mourning and Melancholia a kind of blueprint for the 
problems of identity construction, especially in regard to 
sexual identity. Stressing the difference between mourning as 
a process in which loss is acknowledged and worked with, 
however difficult that may be, and melancholia as a state in 
which the loss itself remains unacknowledged, rendering 
mourning impossible, Butler (1997, p.147) suggests that modern 
patterns of sexual identity-construction arise from a 
melancholic process of divesting oneself from the “never 
loved”. That is, there are certain aspects of desire and 
identification which trouble the social world profoundly and 
which, as a consequence, are so doubly repressed that the 
trace of their very existence is wiped out. Homosexual love in 
a context of what she terms “compulsory heterosexuality” is 
the key instance with which Butler works: not only is 
homosexual desire repressed, but its existence as desire 
itself is obliterated. Hence, gender is formed on the basis of 
occluded desire, as a melancholic incorporation of what once 
was and yet could never be. 
When the prohibition against homosexuality is culturally 
pervasive, then the “loss” of homosexual love is 
precipitated through a prohibition which is repeated and 
ritualised throughout the culture. What ensues is a 
culture of gender melancholy in which masculinity and 
femininity emerge as the traces of an ungrieved and 
ungrieveable love; indeed, where masculinity and 
femininity within the heterosexual matrix are 
strengthened through the repudiations that they perform. 
In opposition to a conception of sexuality which is said 
to “express” a gender, gender itself is here understood 
to be composed of precisely what remains inarticulate in 
sexuality. (Butler, 1997, p.140) 
Taken more broadly, a divide is being indicated here, in which 
knowledge of one’s own “depths” is hampered by the inability 
to engage with the sources of loss. Each of us becomes 
haunted, as a consequence, by some sense of incompleteness, 
without being able to place (or face) its source. 
 
Read in this way, melancholia is a recipe for shallowness 
which does nevertheless allow for the possibility of deep, if 
deeply hidden, feeling. It is therefore related to, but 
distinguished from, a cognate state of what one might call 
continual mourning. This is the state of mind which absolutely 
recognises the existence of a loss, but also -realistically, 
one might say- sees this loss as always present, as something 
which cannot be resolved by mourning. Loss of this kind, 
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perhaps definable as traumatic loss, is clearly a “depth” 
process, in which the psyche is always attuned to the 
something-missing, and is never consoled. In the conversation 
reported earlier, A.S. Byatt described how she felt a part of 
herself had died when her son was killed in an accident. From 
that point, she said, she has lived on two time lines; the 
first stopped with him, the second continues without him. 
Whilst this might under some circumstances shade into 
pathological mourning, in which grief is so oppressive that it 
destroys a person’s life, it might also be considered a 
mentally healthy process of recognition of the enormity and 
absoluteness of loss -the recognition that loss goes on for 
ever. In some people, such a state of mind can be maintained 
whilst also engaging intensely in “the rest of life”, as if 
one part of the psyche, invested in the lost object, stops at 
the moment of the loss, preserving it and maintaining constant 
vigilance over the memory (the state of continual mourning), 
but also effectively freeing the rest of the psyche to carry 
on. This does not meant that the loss is a source of 
creativity or energy, along the lines of the Kleinian theory 
of reparation (Segal, 1981); it merely (but significantly) 
allows loss to continue, the lost object to be treasured and 
mourned for ever, but -being encapsulated- without preventing 
the person concerned from re-entering life. Butler (2003, 
p.12) expresses something akin to this in her evocation of how 
loss binds us into living reality, whilst also revealing the 
falsity of any belief that one can maintain a walled-off self. 
So when one loses, one is also faced with something 
enigmatic: something is hiding in the loss, something is 
lost within the recesses of loss. If mourning involves 
knowing what one has lost (and melancholia, originally, 
means, to a certain extent, not knowing), then mourning 
would be maintained by its enigmatic dimension, by the 
experience of not knowing incited by losing what we 
cannot fully fathom.   
 
Something has been lost “in” the loss itself; it is this that 
is unrecoverable and irreplaceable, that cannot be substituted 
for by anything else and hence that attests to the uniqueness 
of the lost object. Some notion of what might be termed the 
“sacred” has become implicit here, as that which is felt to be 
untouchable, transcendent, protected and of intrinsic value. 
Thinking in terms of inner space, perhaps it is the possession 
of something sacred in these terms that allows one to feel 
depth, and to engage with the reflexiveness which is otherwise 
so hard to sustain. The kind of enduring loss described above, 
however painful, keeps one in contact with the real -with 
something more severe and more intense than the everyday, 
paradoxically shutting off and preserving a deeply felt 
private life. It need not be through loss, however, that this 
occurs, although in the prevailing conditions in which it is 
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so hard to maintain a sense of inner reality, it may be that 
the traumatic conditions of loss are the most potent means to 
produce it. Love, too, could be part of the story, not just 
hopeless love (a good paradigm for melancholia, mourning and 
loss, as psychoanalysis has always recognised), nor even 
passionate love (though this might again be the kind of 
“trauma” that enlivens). Secure love, “enduring love”, is what 
has been focused on in post World War Two British 
psychoanalysis at least -the kind of love that enables an 
infant to internalise a vision of the world as essentially 
benign, capable of holding and containing her or his 
destructiveness and offering a reliable and robust container 
for anxiety. This benevolence on the outside allows risks to 
be taken with the inner world; without such benevolence, there 
is no safety, no prop upon which the internal self can lean. 
Leading theories of borderline and narcissistic states have 
drawn upon this model (e.g. Kernberg, 1975), asserting that 
the failure to form a secure self is a consequence of the 
inability of the “environment” to offer suitable conditions 
for it; instead, inner life is plagued by the sense that too 
strong a feeling, too powerful an impulse, will lead to the 
world collapsing, with selfhood and everything else destroyed. 
The lesson seems to be that a strongly beating heart needs to 
exist at the core of subjectivity if an inner life is to be 
sustained; this beating heart may have the attributes of the 
tragic or of the sublime, each of which can in any case turn 
into the other, because they are based on the premise that 
things matter, and especially that relationships matter, that 
lost objects are not easily replaced, that love, as Freud 
clearly knew (“a love that does not discriminate seems to me 
to forfeit part of its own value, by doing an injustice to its 
object” -Freud, 1930, p.102), is a specific and hence a 
vulnerable affair. The sacred therefore becomes a flame, an 
altar of holiness, connected to sacrifice (in its Hebrew form, 
sacrifice denotes the condition of “bringing close”), which 
keeps something alive. 
 
To think, then, one needs an inner world in which something is 
kept sacred; some pulse must be allowed to beat in an internal 
space. This must be robust enough to survive, no easy task 
when it has to operate in a psychosocial environment in which 
there are both internal and external forces conducive to 
dissipation and destruction. One possible form of this sacred 
space is that of enduring loss, another is of enduring love; 
the two are intimately related, after all. This returns us to 
the question, however, of how it can become possible to “think 
more deeply” in this way, to utilise the sacred and the 
sublime in order to create a more reflective personal space, 
and with that a potentially more reflective society. One does 
not wish to promote traumatic loss, nor rely totally on the 
conditions of perfect early mothering, as the sole route into 
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this, however much they may serve as certain kinds of model. 
 
Recognising the Other 
Much attention is currently being paid to the idea of 
recognition, for example as it appears in the work of Jessica 
Benjamin (1998): 
in the intersubjective conception of recognition, two 
active subjects may exchange, may alternate in expressing 
and receiving, cocreating a mutuality that allows for and 
presumes separateness. (p.29) 
What is being traced here is a particular form of relationship 
between selves and others, a certain handling of the trope 
similarity/difference, in which neither is collapsed into the 
other. Indeed, Benjamin’s approach specifically seeks a 
balance between theories that emphasise difference and those 
that promote a vision of (especially maternal) subjectivity as 
involving a disappearance in the other: recognition staves off 
the absorption of self into the other just as it prevents the 
other being colonised by the self; rather, the possibility is 
raised of allowing difference yet also appreciating structural 
similarity. Benjamin’s notion of recognition seems at first 
glance to describe exactly the experience of the mother, 
Stephanie, in the quotation at the beginning of this essay.  
Mediated by symbolic expression, identification can 
become not a collapse of differentiation, but a basis for 
understanding the position of the other. The kind of 
separation that allows this symbolic development is 
predicated not merely on a boundary set by an outside 
other (an abstract idea of limiting the omnipotent self) 
but rather on a maternal subjectivity that is able to 
represent affect and hence process the pain of separation 
between the mother and her child. (p.28) 
“You,” says Stephanie, mediating her relationship with this 
strange other, her baby, through the use of the word, 
recognising his existence and building a bridge towards him. 
Recognition of this kind is not a merely cognitive event, nor 
is it a passive reflection or mirroring of what is already 
somehow “in” the other. It is, rather, something actively 
reaching-out that makes what it finds, yet also lets the other 
be; it is, in this sense, to redeploy the motif of the sacred 
used earlier, a process of sanctification, in which what is 
found in the other is also cherished specifically for its 
capacity to be different, its otherness. 
 
Building on the rather contrary work both of Winnicott (to 
whom Benjamin (2000) states herself to be deeply indebted) and 
of Lacan (to whom she is mainly opposed), the argument can be 
restated as a privileging of the role of respect for the other 
as other, with whom one has connections, but whose inner space 
cannot be colonised. This is a surprisingly difficult 
aspiration to make material, even in theory: in many 
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psychoanalytic accounts, for example, the highest point of an 
intimate relationship is a process of identification or even 
incorporation, rather than recognition of the otherness of the 
other. Clearly, just seeing the other as different, is not the 
solution: that can be a defence against recognising 
relatedness where it exists, of noting and experiencing the 
similarity of human experience. There is plenty of 
circumstantial evidence, indeed, that this kind of “othering” 
can be a source of social hatred, especially when “different” 
is cast as “alien”  -for example, in ethnic and racist hate 
(Frosh, 2002). Rather, the idea of recognition embraces the 
acknowledgement of existence of the other as other in the 
context of relatedness: there is a real difference, yet this 
difference is not necessarily marked by preference, it is 
“just” difference. There is an other who or which cannot be 
made “same”, but that does not mean that there is a lack of 
connection, only that this connection is for the sake of 
bridging, not for invasion or incorporation. The Benjaminite 
idea, read this way, suggests that becoming “real” is premised 
on the situation in which one’s otherness is noted and 
acknowledged, and valued for what it is. 
 
This notion seems contrary to the idealised version of 
mothering as a process built out of primary maternal 
preoccupation, feeling linked in oneness with the baby 
(Winnicott, 1958). It is not necessarily at odds with other 
psychoanalytic formulations, however. For example, the 
Kleinian insistence that the infant fantasises a corporeal 
absorption in the mother, so that the mental processes of each 
can intertwine, does not of itself rule out the possibility 
that the mother herself will be able to see the infant as 
other. “Reverie”, as Bion (1962) puts it, is a state of mind 
in which projections can be accepted as projections; that is, 
the analytic stance -the stance that promotes the growth of 
thought in both infant and patient- is built on acceptance of 
the way one might be used as an object, or as a container, 
without losing one’s own sense of autonomy.  
Reverie is that state of mind which is open to the 
reception of any “objects” from the loved object and is 
therefore capable of reception of the infant’s projective 
identifications whether they are felt by the infant to be 
good or bad. In short, reverie is a function of the 
mother’s α-function. (Bion, 1962, p.36) 
The power of the mother/analyst in this model is derived from 
her or his capacity to “dip into” the mind of the patient, to 
become utterly connected, whilst also retaining a separate 
existence, coming out of mental sharing in order, for example, 
to make an interpretation or bring a session -or an entire 
analysis- to an end. Winnicott’s (1971) idea of mirroring, 
when extracted from the absorption of the mother in the baby, 
is also a powerful one often used as both a developmental and 
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analytic ideal: the maternal task is to recognise the baby as 
she or he is, and not to impose onto (or into) the infant the 
mother’s own needs; “the mother’s role is of giving back to 
the baby the baby’s own self”. What sparks the child’s “true 
self” into being is supposedly just that experience of being 
recognised, setting in train both a degree of security about 
the acceptability of the self that makes creativity possible, 
and also a lifelong expectation that there will continue to be 
recognition of this kind. The benevolent cycle here is one in 
which feeling oneself to be acknowledged but not impinged 
upon, allows one to think of oneself and one’s inner processes 
as having value rather than being disparaged and inadequate or 
destructive. This promotes the formation of an inner world, 
providing a source upon which one can draw, a resource for 
thoughtfulness and reflective activity. Winnicott’s (1965) 
paper on the capacity to be alone expresses this idea 
persuasively: drawing on the mother’s thoughtfulness and her 
capacity to convey to the child the state of being thought 
about, the child feels free to be alone, to think her or his 
own thoughts, even troubling ones, to follow something 
through. The safety net is there; even if the child falls, 
nothing will be broken. 
 
There are difficulties here, however, which have not gone 
unremarked and which are connected with the elision in the 
previous paragraph between the mother’s subjectivity and that 
of her child. This is both a theoretical problem and a 
reflection of a broader issue, that of how to avoid irritably 
seeking after the other -taking the other over- as a way of 
stabilising the self. How does the mother know what is the 
“actual” otherness of her child, rather than what she imagines 
to be the child’s nature on the basis not only of her 
experience, but of her wishes? In psychoanalysis, how does the 
analyst, steeped in the theories, observations, transferences 
and practices of the analytic community, differentiate between 
the patient’s inner world and the way she or he (the analyst) 
names it? When analysts claim to be able to distinguish 
between those feelings which belong to them (the analyst’s 
transference, let us say) and those which genuinely are put 
into the analyst by the patient (the countertransference), how 
sure can they be that they have it right, that the latter is 
not always reducible to the former? Many a colonial war has 
been fought in the name of liberating the natives. This is a 
version of the Lacanian critique of Klein, that however 
inspired her clinical practice -inspired mainly by her 
willingness to look every appalling reality in the face- it is 
too quick to assume the possibility of actual, true knowledge 
of the other. As Lacanians say about interpretation, this 
renders the other as subject to the desire of the analyst, 
constructed in the light of analytic theory and supposed 
knowledge (see Evans, 1996, pp.87-9). The analyst as “subject 
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supposed to know” here mistakes him or herself for the one who 
actually does know, and in so doing abandoning the analytic 
position. The Lacanian suggestion, antagonistic to the idea 
that “unconscious to unconscious communication” ever really 
occurs, is that all communications are mediated by language, 
and this means that at some level they always fail. 
Misrepresentation, mistranslation, misconstruction: these are 
the stuff of human contact, and believing otherwise is yet 
another aspect of the colonising venture, in which one mind 
fails to see another as sufficiently strange. 
 
The Lacanian narrative has its own tragic element, proposing 
that there is always a fissure between one and the other, that 
connection between human subjects is intrinsically flawed. As 
with the comedy of the mirror phase, this also means that when 
one is most confident that one is thinking for oneself, there 
is the greatest likelihood that one is actually engaging in a 
process of self-mystification. Humankind abhors a vacuum, or 
an infinity of space, so something has to bound it, and this 
something is the imagined security of the other’s gaze. “In 
reality” -or in the Real- what has to be faced is the capacity 
of the subject to disappear inside itself, the fragmentary 
nature of drives, the uncertainty that there is any 
progression towards autonomy at all. However, there is another 
side to this threateningly despairing vision: in claiming that 
no subject can be fully known by another, Lacanian theory 
sustains a space for difference, for remaining other, that 
preserves subjecthood from being demarcated solely by 
another’s wish. Being positioned by the desire of the other is 
one thing, operating in the symbolic, but in the Real such a 
wish can have no purchase. The responsibility of the analyst 
is consequently to promote the patient’s free associations, to 
keep the stream of signifiers unblocked; her or his 
interpretations are “interruptions” aiming merely to stop 
things settling down. The promotion of thought in this model -
not unlike that to be found in Bion (1962)- involves learning 
the difference between a question and an answer: answers stop 
things happening, questions keep them going on. 
 
If Lacanian thought marks communication as impossible, 
Laplanche’s turn of this screw is to conceive of the inner 
world of unconscious desire as somehow placed in the child 
unknowingly by the parent, in the form of the “enigmatic 
signifier”, the residue of the process of unconscious 
seduction passed on through the generations from parent to 
child. This adds a further strand of “alienness” at the core 
of subjecthood: inside each person there is an unconscious 
dimension, as we know, but this unconscious does not “belong” 
to the person, but rather comes inside through an act of mis-
communication, a mode of unwitting seduction, in which the 
parental desire excites the child, without being understood. 
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So we have the reality of the message and the 
irreducibility of the fact of communication. What 
psychoanalysis adds is a fact of its experience, namely 
that this message is frequently compromised, that it both 
fails and succeeds at one and the same time. It is opaque 
to its recipient and its transmitter alike. (Laplanche, 
1999, p.169) 
It is no longer a matter of intention; these things speak for 
themselves. What comes from the one to the other is something 
unknown to both, yet intense in its effect (and affect). The 
infant is invaded by an unconscious message, its private 
spaces inflicted with the sense of “something else”, something 
excessive and too strong, always hinting at its own existence 
without ever letting itself be fully known. The adult, too, 
holds an alien message inside: there is something no-one can 
ever properly know. If this model has force, it is very 
difficult to imagine what a personal, inner space can be; 
however “deep” we go, we find the other already there. 
 
Gazing at the Other 
A continual question with which people are faced -perhaps 
especially analysts, amongst others who take up “helping” and 
pedagogic roles- is, “What do they want of me?” The answer is 
always, “Too much”, and the pressure this generates militates, 
once again, against thought. How can one think when all the 
time there are questions being asked, especially when these 
questions come from within yet are themselves the products of 
the other? What price silence and a space of one’s own? No 
wonder there is so much rage against others, when the other 
will not let one alone. It takes a mighty effort of ethical 
resistance, such as that to be found in Levinas’ philosophy, 
to make the other primary in this, to hold onto the trajectory 
of recognition rather than revulsion. The existence of a 
sphere of otherness within does possess the virtue of linking 
us with every subject, as we are all the same in this regard 
and can never claim our subjecthood as autonomous and whole, 
but then how can our demons be faced, how can the depths be 
reclaimed? In what follows, we want to suggest that Levinas’ 
unrelenting attitude towards otherness displaces the 
psychoanalytic tendency to elide the personal and the 
intersubjective, and may provide an admittedly harsh and 
“impossible”, yet also fascinating and provocative, model of 
what could be involved in having a private, interior space. 
 
Here is a lengthy quotation from Levinas’ (1991) Entre Nous on 
“the face”. 
In my analysis, the Face is definitely not a plastic form 
like a portrait; the relation to the Face is both the 
relation to the absolutely weak -to what is absolutely 
exposed, what is bare and destitute, the relation with 
bareness and consequently with what is alone and can 
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undergo the supreme isolation we call death- and there 
is, consequently, in the Face of the Other always the 
death of the Other and thus, in some way, an incitement 
to murder, the temptation to go to the extreme, to 
completely neglect the other -and at the same time (and 
this is the paradoxical thing) the Face is also the “Thou 
Shalt not Kill”. A Thou-Shalt-not-Kill that can also be 
explicated much further: it is the fact that I cannot let 
the other die alone, it is like a calling out to me. And 
you see (and this seems important to me), the 
relationship with the other is not symmetrical, it is not 
all as in Martin Buber. When I say Thou to an I, to a me, 
according to Buber I would always have that me before me 
as the one who says Thou to me. Consequently, there would 
be a reciprocal relationship. According to my analysis, 
on the other hand, in the relation to the face, it is 
asymmetry that is affirmed: at the outset I hardly care 
what the other is with respect to me, that is his own 
business; for me, he is above all the one I am 
responsible for. (pp.104-5) 
This primacy of the other has given rise to a great deal of 
philosophical debate, and it is not clear that all its 
implications stand up to scrutiny, particularly in connection 
with what is called in the same source the “face of the 
executioner”. However, there is something robust to be 
admitted here: nothing contingent is assumed in relation to 
how the other will treat the self, there is no expectation of 
the effectivity of “love of one’s neighbour”. Being 
responsible for the other does not mean that something 
reciprocal will occur, it exists simply as an ethical 
imperative, as that which makes one human. Indeed, Levinas 
makes it clear both here and elsewhere that this relationship 
of responsibility -this ethical relation- is in his view 
primary, rather than following on from something pre-existent. 
It is not the case that the human subject exists and then 
engages in ethical relations; rather, ethics is the defining 
feature of subjectivity itself.  
I speak of responsibility as the essential, primary and 
fundamental structure of subjectivity. For I describe 
subjectivity in ethical terms. Ethics, here, does not 
supplement a preceding existential base; the very node of 
the subjective is knotted in ethics understood as 
responsibility. I understand responsibility as 
responsibility for the Other, thus as responsibility for 
what is not my deed, or for what does not even matter to 
me; or which precisely does matter to me, is met by me as 
face. (Levinas, 1985, p.95) 
By fiat, aspiration or observation -it is not really clear 
from which domain this comes- Levinas insists that 
responsibility for the other comes before the subject can even 
know what the other is; it is, consequently, an absolute 
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given, and the recognition which is part of it is as non-
contingent as can be. Indeed, the term “recognition” is 
inappropriate within the Levinasian domain, because of its 
implication that somehow through the act of recognition, the 
other becomes known. Realising that one “does not know and has 
never seen” the other, yet that the other exists and is 
revealed in the figure of the face, is not the same as 
recognition in the conventional sense. Rather, it is an 
absolute refusal of the impulse to believe that the other can 
ever be brought within the realm of the self -including what 
can be understood by the self. Even more so, “at the outset I 
hardly care what the other is with respect to me”; knowledge 
of what the other might be, what use or reciprocity might 
derive from it, is irrelevant; the other is not any specific 
“person”, but that which is outside what can be claimed by the 
self. Knowing the other would be part of the colonising act of 
reducing it to the same; in the Levinasian confrontation with 
the face, as opposed to Benjaminite intersubjective 
recognition, the otherness of the other is always maintained.  
 
This throws into a certain kind of relief the subjectivity of 
the analyst/parent as it emerges in the encounter with the 
patient/infant. Reciprocity may ensue from the recognition 
given to the infant, but that is neither predictable nor 
necessary (and it seems likely that love of the child for the 
parent will be much more ambivalent than the other way 
around). Winnicott (1971), for one, realises this, with his 
emphasis on how the infant uses the mother, the importance, 
for example, of her willingness to submit herself to the 
infant’s aggression, and her capacity to survive. What makes a 
subject of the parent is the parent’s assumption of 
responsibility, a non-contingent assumption which comes with 
unexpected simplicity, an act of altruism -as Byatt’s 
Stephanie realises in the cataclysm that occurs late in Still 
Life. Despite everything, that is, what is being demanded is a 
“thinking-aboutness” that creates the possibility for thought; 
this constitutes the ethical relation with the other, the 
taking of responsibility, through which the subject’s own 
subjectivity is formed. 
 
The capacity to sustain an ethical relationship with the other 
becomes here the condition of human subjectivity. To be able 
to think deeply, it seems, one has to be able to assume that 
there is something else outside, worthy of being -demanding to 
be- thought about. Perhaps the story goes something like this. 
The “weakness” of the face creates an incitement to impose on 
it one’s own desire; as Levinas puts it in the quotation 
above, “to murder, the temptation to go to the extreme, to 
completely neglect the other”. Psychologically, this is an 
incitement to colonise the other, to make that inner scene 
one’s own. Resisting this temptation involves taking 
 13
responsibility by standing clear, remaining in a distant 
enough relationship to allow something separate to flower, yet 
also in sufficient connection to not “let the other die 
alone”. This taking-responsibility humanises the self, 
creating an inner space which exists precisely because it is 
so aware that there is something else which is “other”, which 
cannot be reduced or owned. Certainly, if Laplanche is right, 
this awareness will be contaminated by the unconscious desire 
of the other, so that some excessive restlessness will always 
be there; that seems to be unavoidable in the human context, 
and this “excess” is exactly what psychoanalysis deals with 
all the time. But this is not the same as reducing it to the 
intersubjective, where self and other feed off and negotiate 
with each other until they reach a balance of sameness and 
difference. What Levinas emphasises is the irreconcilability 
of difference, the absoluteness of the other with which we are 
yet required to be in relation, a situation which is truly 
“impossible” both logically and psychologically.  
 
The starkness of this may in important ways seem too much. 
However imaginary the relationship of intersubjectivity might 
be, psychoanalysts tend to aspire to contact with their 
patients, and can reasonably claim that they have an ethical 
responsibility to do so. The slippage, mentioned earlier, 
between the subjectivity of the mother and that of her infant 
is another example: one seeks always to know, “what will this 
produce, what good will it do?” Yet there is, arguably, an 
important aspect of the analytic attitude that does not allow 
this particular ethics -the ethics of making contact, of doing 
good- primary status. Discussing the trend towards 
“narrativism” in psychoanalysis (as in other social sciences), 
Laplanche (2003) argues that making a coherent narrative can 
be seen as a defensive process, repressing knowledge of 
precisely that “otherness” which is contained in the enigmatic 
message. Summarising, Laplanche makes a point that can be 
taken as a general comment on the relationship between 
psychoanalytic therapy and psychoanalytic understanding. 
The fact that we are confronted with a possibly “normal”, 
and in any case inevitable defence, that the narration 
must be correlated with the therapeutic aspect of the 
treatment, in no way changes the metapsychological 
understanding that sees in it the guarantee and seal of 
repression. That is to say, that the properly “analytic” 
vector, that of de-translation and the questioning of 
narrative structures and the ideas connected to them, 
remains opposed in every treatment to the reconstructive, 
synthesising narrative vector. (p.29) 
Limits to making sense, to making connections, have to be set. 
In the context of this paper, this means that thinking is 
deepened when the otherness of the other is acknowledged first 
of all, when “strangeness” and difference are seen as the 
 14
essential elements in human subjectivity. This is not an 
isolationist philosophy; quite the contrary, it suggests that 
the other is needed in order to make the subject exist, but it 
is needed in its ethical proximity as other, not for what it 
can provide or reciprocate, but as something at which one must 
look. This other, this “face” and the demand it makes simply 
by being there, inaugurates an inner space which, for once, is 
not constituted through seeking after self-esteem or security. 
Instead, the answer to the question, “What are the conditions 
under which it is possible to think?” might just be, “When one 
accepts that the other exists.” 
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